THE PRICE OF PEACE?

If there is one war torn land among too many that has long needed peace it is probably Afghanistan. While peace in Afghanistan has to be a good thing, that peace may come with a particularly high price for Afghan women. These are anxious times for Afghan women, as they are trapped between the grim consequences of war and the prospects of a potentially grim peace.

When the Taliban fell from power, many Afghans hoped for peace and a legitimate stable government. Women and girls who had suffered such brutality during the Taliban era, and in previous decades of conflict, hoped for improvements in their lives. World leaders promised a great deal of help and there were improvements which came quickly as girls began to return to schools in some numbers, women became more visible in public life and many returned to work.

Barely 13 years have passed since the attacks on New York and Washington DC and the US lead NATO coalition invasion of Afghanistan which overthrew the Taliban government. Victory, however that is defined in Afghanistan has proved particularly elusive. Since 2001 some 3,475 international troops have died in a campaign that but for the distraction of the invasion of Iraq, should have been over years ago. At present some 40,000 troops (mostly from the NATO-led coalition) remain in Afghanistan, this figure is down from a peak commitment of 150,000 back in 2011.

The NATO-led coalition plans to retain around 12,000 troops in the country after its combat mission officially comes to an end on December 31, 2014. Since 2001, 453 British troops have died during the campaign and 615 British personnel have been seriously, or very seriously, wounded. 7,422 British personnel have been treated in field hospitals during the campaign. 2,187 were classified as wounded in action and 5,235 were treated for disease and non-battle injuries.

The number of Afghan civilians killed or injured in the conflict in the first six months of 2014 rose by a quarter from 2013 levels to nearly 5,000 people. The UN says three quarters of the deaths and injuries were the result of insurgent attacks. It has been estimated (in 2013) that the UK will have spent at least £ 37 billion pounds on the campaign, expenditure will top out at £ 40 billon pounds by 2020.

There have been some real improvements, when the Taliban ruled Afghanistan; only 1.2 million students were enrolled in schools, with some 50,000 of those being girls. Thirteen years down the line, NATO noted that there were 8.2 million students and nearly 40 percent, or 3.2 million, were girls.

Afghanistan when compared with much of the autocratic neighbouring states of Eurasia (particularly in Central Asia) is a relatively flourishing if wobbly democracy. Several million Afghans actually voted to choose a successor to Hamid Karzai in the first round of this year’s presidential election campaign. While the final result took five months to resolve after a row about electoral fraud it was peacefully resolved.

Back in July 2013 the problem of all pervasive corruption which impacts on all aspects of normal life and the lack of transparency were recognized by the US Government. They remain the main challenges towards establishing a self-sustaining Afghanistan and a stable Afghan government.

The UN Office on Drugs and Crime has also reported that prosecutors and judges are among the government officials most likely to receive bribes. This is something that does not suggest that the Afghan end of the failing war on drugs is going to work anytime soon.

The US Senate (back in July 2013) recognized that despite tangible improvements since 2001 that Afghan women face entrenched discrimination and real limits to their freedom. Violence against women remains widespread and largely underreported. Recent ISAF efforts to get Afghan authorities to respond to complaints by women actually resulted in an increase in reporting of such violence.

Yet despite improvements Afghan women and girls have continued to pay a heavy price in the zones of conflict in Afghanistan: they have been killed and wounded by insurgents, hit by and airstrikes; been subject to local codes of honor, the victims of intrusive “night raids” by both the Taliban, Hezb-i-Islami and international soldiers. Women’s movement has been restricted by insecurity; and this has meant the loss of access to work for family breadwinners.

The Taliban and Hezb-i-Islami insurgents have regularly denied Afghan girls the right to education with attacks on schools and threats against teachers or students. In the more unstable areas, women have been denied the right to work and attacked or threatened for working outside their homes.

On the back of the positives peace should be welcomed, but if the Taliban and other insurgent commanders are brought into government as part of the peace process – it is Afghan women (and girls) who may pay the ultimate price. There are real concerns that violence and threats directed against women will only increase along with hostility to women’s rights and day-to-day harassment.

Those women, who speak up for their rights, including female members of Parliament, regularly come under threat. These threats may become greater particularly for those who voice their fears and concerns about the political reemergence of the Taliban, whose leaders are accustomed to threatening and killing those who criticize or oppose them.

The threats don’t just come from the Taliban. As international interest in Afghanistan begins to wane and the country fades from the headlines, the opponents of women’s rights have already begun to roll back the progress made since the end of Taliban rule (and this is before the Taliban have been brought in from the cold).

Back in May 2013 an Afghan parliamentary debate on the ground-breaking Law on the Elimination of Violence Against Women (EVAW Law), passed by presidential decree in 2009, was halted after barely 15 minutes of debate after numerous lawmakers argued for the law’s repeal and spoke out against the proposed legal protections for women and girls.

In the last few years a number of prominent women in Afghan public life have been murdered, including provincial councilor and peace activist Sitara Achakzai, a senior police commander Malalai Kakar, an outspoken journalist Zakia Zaki, and women’s affairs director Safia Amajan. Their killers have never been brought to justice. This effective impunity actually emboldens those responsible and has greatly added to the risks and fears faced by activist women.

There are genuine concerns that the reintegration and reconciliation negotiations could seriously affect women’s rights. The Afghan government (based on its recent track record) probably won’t actively protect women’s hard earned rights. The Karzai government has sacrificed rights to appease hard line religious factions for the sake of short-term political expediency. The soon to be ex-President signed the discriminatory Shia Personal Status Law (which denied numerous rights of Shia women, including child custody and freedom of movement), back in March 2009 and also provided presidential pardons for two convicted gang rapists.

The Afghan government has given little reassurance to women who are understandably concerned about the risks of reintegration and reconciliation. Back in April 2010, Abdul Hadi Arghandiwal, (the Minister of Economy) a prominent Hezb-i-Islami leader, allegedly informed a gathering of women leaders discussing reconciliation that women would have to sacrifice their interests for the sake of peace. 

Afghan government officials offer weak promises that only those who were not connected to al Qaeda, renounced violence, and agreed to abide by the Afghan constitution would be allowed to reintegrate or join the reconciliation process. Article 22 of the Afghan constitution publically enshrines the equality of men and women, the constitution is no guarantee as it is often routinely ignored and violated, and there are very limited legal avenues for redress for women – there will be even less once NATO departs and Afghanistan fades from the news.

DYING TO VOTE

Yesterday (Tuesday), the 1st of April 2014, was the last day for Afghans to register to vote for the Friday 5th April presidential and provincial elections. Millions of Afghans have stood in long lines and defied the threat of attacks from militants to obtain their voter cards. A significant number of those Afghans who rushed to register to vote in this year’s elections have been women.

Afghanistan's Independent Election Commission, has reported that around 3.8 million new voters have been registered for the 5th April elections. More than one-third of these new voters are women. That's a significant number in a deeply conservative country like Afghanistan, where women continue to face considerable obstacles in exercising their basic rights.

Many Afghan women are understandably concerned about the prospect of losing some of the real and hard-won gains that have been secured over the last 10 years. Something that may well occur once the majority of foreign combat troops leave at the end of this year. Already, a noticeable drawback has been noted when it comes to women's rights even before the foreign troops leave. Female lawmakers have been unsuccessful in their attempts to outlaw violence against women.

Conservative male lawmakers have looked to reintroduce stoning as the punishment for adultery, not to mention a law that prevents victims of violence and abuse from testifying against husbands and other relatives. At the same time, the number of seats reserved for women in provincial councils has been reduced, prompting criticism from local and international rights groups.

That said, for this set of elections, for the moment at least is different, a number of the presidential candidates have highlighted the importance of female voters in this election, with three of them choosing women as their second vice-presidential running mates. One of most high-profile woman among the presidential tickets is Habiba Sarabi, the second vice-presidential running mate for Zalmai Rasul, a former foreign minister who is one of the favourites to become the country's next president.

If the Rasul Presidential tickect wins the poll, then Sarabi would become Afghanistan's first female vice presidents. Sarabi, a 57-year-old pharmacist, has already made history by becoming Afghanistan’s first female provincial governor back in 2005. In a bid to encourage women to vote, Sarabi has attended many of Rasul's election rallies, telling women to seize their opportunity to determine their country's future direction.

At the same time, Rula, the wife of candidate Ashraf Ghani, has campaigned beside her husband. Rula, a Lebanese Christian, she has attended numerous meetings and rallies, previously an extremely rare occurrences in a country where the current first lady almost never appears in public. When compared to previous elections, thousands of Afghan women and girls have attended election rallies, participated in candidates' conventions, or worked as campaigners in# the 2014 vote.

THE ART OF FORGETTING ANNIVERSARIES

Remembering anniversaries is always difficult, some you may struggle to forget, others you may choose not to remember. Exactly twenty-five years ago today, on May 15, 1988, Soviet troops began a nine-month process of withdrawing from Afghanistan. Around 100,000 troops left the country by February 15, 1989, after nine years of war which saw the death of more than 14,000 Soviet soldiers and hundreds of thousands of Afghan combatants and civilians. 

The Soviet Army withdraws from Afghanistan - 25 years ago today.

It can be said that history by and large never repeats itself, the geography may remain constant, the same place names will keep cropping up and there may be similarities of circumstance and similarity of outcome – but that’s about it. By way of coincidence NATO, who it must be said have behaved with significantly more restraint and significantly less brutally than the forces of the old Soviet Union,  is also in the process of winding down it’s Afghan war and Afghan commitments, after nearly 13 years.

When the dust settles, at least the as far as the Western political leaders are concerned the Afghan problem will go away and drop out of the headlines. The spin will be spun and it will be laid on thick this spring and summer as success in Afghanistan will be brazenly redefined. The harsh reality is that military success, however dearly bought has not necessarily delivered political victory or political stability.

Cameron and Obama’s inherited war will end, hopefully, with a whimper rather than anything else, save for a faint whiff of imperial hubris. Military and political success have become intertwined in Afghanistan, now they will be separated. Our soldiers will finally come home, hopefully with the absolute minimum of casualties and what began in the autumn and winter of 2001 will come relatively peacefully to a conclusion.

The spin will endeavour to hide the failure to tackle the underlying poverty and the blatant institutional corruption in Afghanistan. At a very basic level this has meant that the country has been largely left un-taxable, which aside from not been able to pay for its own occupation, its government has been (and will be) left dangerously dependent on foreign aid.

The financial costs of ‘policing’ this largely inaccessible land alone have been on a different scale and have been pretty much born by the occupiers. The financial costs of keeping two US marine battalions in Helmand has resulted in financial costs per year greater than all the US military and development aid to Egypt per year, some $100 billion dollars).

Much of the foreign aid fails to get where it is supposed to go, getting skimmed off along the way. Now none of this should surprise anyone very much as when you factor in weak and corrupt local political leadership and our very poor choice of allies it was pretty predictable.

The Transparency International in 2013 Corruption Index (CPI) currently ranks Afghanistan (at 175) as one of the (joint) most corrupt country with North Korea and Somalia. President Hamid Karzai in the United State for the NATO Summit in Chicago (back in 2012) was asked by CNN’s Wolf Blitzer about this rampant corruption issue in Afghanistan. As usual, President Karzai’s answer was “it is the contractual mechanism that the US applies in Afghanistan” that encourages bribery, fraud, and corruption.

The Afghan President continues to always blame the west for the loss of billions of aid dollars and the rise of corruption in Afghanistan. The reality is less simple as on a daily basis, ordinary Afghans are less concerned about the kinds of bribery that is (and does) occur when the US and Western  development agencies hand out big development contracts. Ordinary Afghans are more infuriated by the kinds of bribes that they often have to give to get what they are legally entitled to via “harassment bribes.”

Basically harassment bribes are like when a retired Afghan has to pay some cash to the pension officer to receive his retirement check. Or, when a young man or woman freshly graduated from college has to get his or her paperwork done in order to become a teacher. To accomplish this the prospective teacher will be asked to pay a hefty bribe. Or your Tazkira or national ID card is held up until you pay some cash to the officer in charge. These are all simple illustration of harassment bribes.

Harassment bribery is widespread in Afghanistan, and it plays a large role in breeding inefficiency and has a profoundly destructive effect on civil society. While President Karzai consistently wags the finger at the West for widespread corruption in Afghanistan, yet his administration has failed to take responsibility for banishing bribery on the lower level. The West, perhaps hoping for a compliant Afghan government has looked the other way, which means that local low level corruption gets written off as a fact of life – despite that it is something that indirectly may feed support for the Taliban. 

To this sorry mess you have to add what has pretty much been a complete lack of understanding of the real challenges in Afghanistan and not to mention regularly changing objectives. So it should be no surprise that there has been a real lack of a coherent or consistent planning and realistic objectives, so it is no wonder that the medium term future of Afghanistan is as yet undetermined.

The final telling factor that makes the Afghan situation so tragic considering the lives lost and changed forever not to mention the treasure spent, is that of mission creep. This has taken place on a heroic scale, with the war on terror becoming the war on drugs and the possibly fatal consequences of diverting resources to Iraq before the job in Afghanistan was even defined, let alone half done.  

THE WAR OF THE WORDS

The war of the words, despite last evenings vote against military action without parliamentary approval, continues, while the war on the ground in Syria (and body count grows ever higher). Clearly the experience of Iraq and Afghanistan weighed heavily on MP’s minds in Westminster yesterday. Whatever the merits of the intervention or not with regard to the conflict in Syria are, we are all somewhere different to where we were in 2003. The fact that Blair favoured intervention swung some of my relatives to a position of opposition to intervention. Armed intervention in Syria with or without UN approval (which is unlikely with the Russian and Chinese veto) would be a risky business.

The Syrian situation is far more complicated than was the situation in Iraq and Afghanistan – in theory Saddam could have fled to exile, but, Assad has nowhere to go and neither does his constituency of support amongst the sizeable (and well armed) Alawite minority.  Last evenings vote of Westminster MP's against military intervention in Syria may send sizeable shock waves through the Obama administration. Whereas previously the Brits have tended to march in step with the US, this rejection of President Barack Obama's argument may well upset the special relationship for some time to come.

It can be argued this key event has been a long time coming, and save for Harold Wilson’s refusal to commit UK ground troops to Vietnam in the 1960’s (which was duly punished) it has largely been avoided (at least since Suez). Certainly before last night’s vote, the US administration appeared relatively relaxed about David Cameron's problems and any delays in the Brits joining the new collation. Now in the cold light of day things may be different, it may to too early to say whether or not the Brits have finally cast of their adoptive mantle of Uncle Sam’s poodle.

The trigger for any intervention has been the alleged use of chemical weapons against civilians by the Syrian regime, the latest of possible 14 instances of chemical weapons use,  may yet trigger a US-led military response. The UN route may be blocked with Russia and China very publically opposed to any military action, which means that the UN Security Council will be unable to give its backing to any intervention which may raise some questions about the legal basis for military intervention.

Any desire for intervention may relate more to Syria (and the strategic situation in the Middle East) than it does to the use of chemical weapons as such. They have been used before (on some scale) by Saddam Hussein, against the Iranians (during the Iran – Iraq war) and later against the Kurds. On both occasion the Western Allies (and the USA) said next to nothing as Saddam was their boy - he was only to become a problem later when he invaded Kuwait (triggering the first gulf war back in 1991).

Last evenings cross-party amendment on Syria called for legal evidence and UN inspectors reports to be presented before any decision is taken on military action are taken, something that most reasonable people would probably agree with as a reasonable and rational response to the crisis. Judging by the look on David Cameron’s face last night as the debate concluded in a government defeat there may be trouble ahead and the one sided ‘special relationship’ may be on hold for the foreseeable future. 

Perhaps finally the lessons of Afghanistan and Iraq may have sunk in and days of the UK  strutting the stage and over extending itself by pretending to be a global player are over - it may be too early to say. That said, something needs to be done to bring an end to the increasingly bloody conflict in Syria – doing that will require UN approval (which is unlikely) and a plan (which may well be nonexistent if recent experiences in Iraq are anything to go by).  

So as the war of words continues in the West, the war on the ground will continue in the Middle East, the refugee crisis will get worse and the body count will grow ever higher. There was as far as I could perceive last evening only as slight if faint whiff of Munich wafting through some of the MP's in the House of Commons last evening - perhaps prompted by some of the friends of Syria (Assad); that said  the vote should not be an excuse of inaction or indifference to the plight of the people of Syria, as something still needs to be done. 

SOMEWHERE BETWEEN TRAGEDY AND FARCE

When it comes to the Afghan tragedy, a few quotes spring to mind, Karl Marx said "Hegel remarks somewhere that all great, world-historical facts and personages occur, as it were, twice. He has forgotten to add: the first time as tragedy, the second as farce." Winston Churchill said, "Those that fail to learn from history, are doomed to repeat it" and “Men occasionally stumble over the truth, but most of them pick themselves up and hurry off as if nothing ever happened.” When it comes to Afghanistan there is more than enough history to provide enough examples of what to do and what to avoid.

A scene from the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan

The long and bloody history of Afghanistan is littered literally with the would-be invaders who came to grief and eventually through in the towel and admitted defeat. This week, almost unnoticed an anniversary passed, Wednesday 15th May was the twenty-fifth anniversary of the start of the then Soviet Union’s nine month long withdrawal from Afghanistan. Around 100,000 Soviet troops had left the war torn country by February 15, 1989. This was the conclusion to ten years of brutal warfare which had killed over 14,000 Soviet soldiers and hundreds of thousands of Afghan combatants and civilians.

Learning the lesson of history?

NATO forces have been on the ground in Afghanistan since the 7th October 2001, and preparations for NATO’s withdrawal (to be completed by 2014) are proceeding apace. Unlike their Soviet predecessors who treated much of Afghanistan as free fire zone, NATO forces have been relatively restrained when it comes to using their firepower. Despite this many people have argued that just like their Soviet predecessors NATO troops in Afghanistan now find themselves engaged in waging a campaign which is "unwinnable in military terms".

‘Lessons from Afghanistan’s History for the Current Transition and Beyond’ is a thought provoking paper produced by the MOD Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre makes interesting reading.  The paper has noted that between 1933 to 1973, Afghanistan was stable and reasonably effectively governed, however, that stability was firmly anchored in the two pillars of traditional local governance and the Afghan state such as it was a weak centralized though weak state, both of which were gravely damaged after 1978.

Afghanistan history’s is littered with a series of chronic succession problems and associated conflict, the next presidential election, if successful, would be the first peaceful transfer of leadership since 1933 and only the fourth since 1747. The paper also notes that any expectations about the pace of any progress and reform should be modest and the dangers of overly ambitious reforms leading to violent reactions need to be recognized.

‘A new approach to understanding Afghanistan’s transition’ has been produced by the United States Institute for Peace also makes interesting reading. This paper by way of comparison with other countries who have passed though conflict, significant military intervention and  a post conflict period of transition looks at Afghanistan and its preparedness for life after NATO. Amongst the key issues that this report flags up is the issue of foreign aid and its impact on Afghanistan.

Another military withdrawal from Afghanistan 

Of late there has been a relative flood of papers from a whole range of military and civilian institutes studying and analysing what has happen and what may happen in Afghanistan as NATO prepares to leave. While our soldiers and their families and many Afghans may carry the physical and mental scars for decades, the politicians (at least in the West) will probably do their best to air brush Afghanistan and the consequences of NATO’s intervention out of site and out of mind.

As someone who has had relatives who have served a number of tours in Afghanistan and have come back in one piece I will (no doubt along with more than a few other people) be more than grateful when the last NATO soldier hops on the last plane and comes home. Following NATO’S withdrawal I have little doubt that what will follow will be a public redefinition of ‘success’ at least as it is applied to Afghanistan. Quite where that leaves the Afghans and Afghan women's rights whatever future they face with a still active Taliban, rampant corruption and a curtailing of foreign aid remains to be seen, but nowhere good I suspect.

THE BIG BUG OUT?

Making plans to leave...

Some minds are understandably focused on the Afghan exit strategy and how to get out while keeping NATO casualties to a minimum. Now I don’t for a moment question the courage and endurance of our service personnel who have been sent by the politicians in Westminster to complete a near impossible task.

I remain however critical of what followed, when collective eyes were taken off the ball and Afghanistan was effectively placed on the back burner out of sight and out of mind for a dubiously motivated and justified invasion of Iraq. I also deeply question the wobbly logic that ran riot and the mission creep that developed in relation to Afghanistan during the latter years of the Blair and Brown governments, after attention shifted back from Iraq. 

The Con Dem government is largely blameless inheriting the ongoing car accident of Afghanistan from its predecessor formerly New Labour government, who should take the full measure of blame for the unfolding mess. However things are spun, the reality is that things are not going well, it has been revealed (in a UN report) that three times as much opium was produced in Helmand last year than was being produced when British troops first moved in 2006.

A report by the UN's Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) forecasts an increase in opium production this year and says this has been partly caused by the lack of agricultural assistance. The report blames the situation on insecurity. As the pullout progresses and international troops wind down their combat role, the increase in poppy cultivation is a significant failure for the international project, and particularly the UK's role in it.

Most of the worldwide production of illegal heroin, the drug refined from opium, comes from Afghanistan, and the then Prime Minister Tony Blair cited this as a reason for the war in 2001, calling the drugs trade a part of the Taliban regime that "we should seek to destroy". Back in 2001, the Brits (and the USA) made a deal with the surviving Taliban to reduce opium production by 94%.

Just before the invasion Taliban actually brought in a ban on poppy growing, declaring it to be anti-Islam, which lowered the overall production. After the invasion, rightly or wrongly as result of Blair’s decision the UK took a lead role in counter-narcotics from the beginning, and sent troops to Helmand in 2006 partly because this was the largest area of poppy cultivation.  The UK (back in 2002) became the lead nation for counter narcotic activities in Afghanistan. British cash for a voluntary eradication programme which was run in 2002 produced what has been described independently as “a total failure.”

Ironically Opium production has actually become more important to Afghanistan’s economy since US and NATO forces invaded back in October 2001. After an initial drop in opium production caused by NATO’s invasion, opium production resumed and now the country produces some 90 per cent of the world’s opium, the great bulk of which now ends up on the streets of Europe and Russia.

Now the UN report predicts that this year more than 75,000 hectares of land in Helmand is under cultivation for opium poppies, three times as much as in 2006 - and this is expected to increase. In Afghanistan any counter narcotics activities are merely an unavoidable occupational hazard because there is no viable alternative industry which can create the 50% of licit GDP that opium trading represents.

Opium, which is the basic raw material for heroin, and most of the illegal drugs that are on sale on the UK's streets come from Afghanistan. Afghanistan’s Government and business leaders operate in a wildly unregulated free market economy, where opium offers the safest and most profitable investment available to both peasant farmers and Narco-entrepreneurs.

The World Bank recognises that the narcotics trade accounts for 1/3 of all economic activity and acts as a major source of demand for services, goods and construction. The trade also provides income and livelihoods for a large number of people generates almost half a billion dollars a year for farmers.  Perversely the drugs trade goes on giving by providing several hundred million dollars in income for labourers and supports the country’s ramshackle rural economy.

The bank also acknowledges that the trade actually supports the Afghan balance of payments to the point that it produce a net surplus, not to mention supports the Afghan currency. Additionally as a result of imports from drug proceeds actually generates significant amounts of customs revenue (Source: The Fulcrum Strategy (Version 3) By David James, July 2006).

The problem is that the drug trade destabilises Afghanistan, and the chronic corruption and the effects of the ongoing insurgency combine to actively undermine the country’s tax base.  Security aside a stable tax base is one of the key requirements if the Afghan Government, post pull-out, is going to be able to sustain a potentially prolonged campaign against the Taliban.

Any Government that is pretty much dependent on foreign aid in lieu of a revenue stream is in trouble that might work out over the short-term but will not last over the longer term. What may in the end lead to the plug being pulled and foreign aid drying up is that much of the international aid to Afghanistan ends up being stolen before it ever gets to its intended recipients. 

The problem for the rest of us is that the opium based drug trade’s impact spreads far beyond the porous boundaries of Afghanistan. Back in March, Viktor Ivanov, the head of Russia’s Federal Drug Control Service, made a presentation to UN’s 56th session of the Commission on Narcotic Drugs in Vienna, stating that, opium growth has increased by 18 per cent from 131,000 hectares to 154,000 and that “Afghan heroin has killed more than 1 million people worldwide since the ‘Operation Enduring Freedom’ began and over a trillion dollars has been invested into transnational organized crime from drug sales”.

Transparency International in its 2012 Corruption Index (CPI) ranked Afghanistan as one of the (joint) most corrupt country with North Korea and Somalia. President Hamid Karzai in the United State for the NATO Summit in Chicago (in 2012) was asked by CNN’s Wolf Blitzer about this rampant corruption issue in Afghanistan. As usual, President Karzai’s answer was “it is the contractual mechanism that the US applies in Afghanistan” that encourages bribery, fraud, and corruption.

The Afghan President has consistently blamed the west for the loss of billions of aid dollars and the rise of corruption in Afghanistan. The harsh reality is less simple as on a daily basis, ordinary Afghans are less concerned about the kinds of bribery that occurs when the US and Western  development agencies hand out big development contracts. Ordinary Afghans are more infuriated by the kinds of bribes that they often have to give to get what they are legally entitled to via “harassment bribes.”

Basically harassment bribes are like when a retired Afghan has to pay some cash to the pension officer to receive his retirement check. Or, when a young man or woman freshly graduated from college has to get his or her paperwork done in order to become a teacher. To accomplish this any prospective teacher will be asked to fork out a hefty bribe. Or your Tazkira or national ID card is held up until you pay some cash to the officer in charge. These are all simple illustration of harassment bribes.

Saigon  (in 1975) or Kabul (in 2015)

Harassment bribery is widespread in Afghanistan, and it plays a large role in breeding inefficiency and has a profoundly destructive effect on civil society. While President Karzai consistently wags the finger at the West for widespread corruption in Afghanistan, yet his administration has failed to take responsibility for banishing bribery on the lower level. The West has for a quiet life has looked the other way as local low level corruption tends to be written off as a fact of life something that indirectly may feed support for the Taliban. 

Overwhelmed by both large and small scale corruption what can an effectively endemically corrupt Afghan government seriously do to discourage bribe givers and takers (at all levels of government) even if it wanted to? Endemic corruption aside the security situation is the key, with NATO leaving and the Taliban waiting in the wings even a diehard optimist would struggle not to think that things don’t look good.

Behind the NATO pullout lurks the unspoken question of how can a successful NATO withdrawal ensure that the corrupt Karzai Government retains its hold on power. And at least in the short term can they (the Afghan Government) keep the Taliban at arm’s length and can the whole sorry process be made to look good for domestic political consumption at home.  

DEVELOPMENT, INVESTMENT AND CORUPTION

As NATO’s commitment to Afghanistan winds down, the Westminster Government is aiming to fund a £10 million pound programme to help Afghanistan exploit its huge natural resources. This may sound too many people like a lot of money but considering that estimates of what lies underground in Afghanistan range from some $1 – 3 trillion dollars (US) worth of gold, gems, iron ore, and oil and gas. Now this has little to do with largess, no doubt hoping for a percentage, David Cameron’s three-year funding programme, to support the Afghan Ministry of Mines was launched at an event at Downing Street (March 6th).

UK Mining Aid in Afghanistan: Throwing Good Money After Bad?

The announcement came as Mr Cameron hosted dozens of UK investors and mining contractors at Downing Street.  He said the UK had already played "a huge and honourable role" in stabilising Afghanistan, but that the country needed "prosperity, growth, jobs, investment and wealth". British mining companies welcomed the announcement. Cameron’s decision could be described as courageous, especially with the claims that the award of mining contracts in Afghanistan after the fall of the Taliban were directly affected by corruption.

Transparency International in 2012 Corruption Index (CPI) currently ranks Afghanistan as one of the (joint) most corrupt country with North Korea and Somalia. President Hamid Karzai in the United State for the NATO Summit in Chicago (in 2012) was asked by CNN’s Wolf Blitzer about this rampant corruption issue in Afghanistan. As usual, President Karzai’s answer was “it is the contractual mechanism that the US applies in Afghanistan” that encourages bribery, fraud, and corruption.

The Afghan President has always blamed the west for the loss of billions of aid dollars and the rise of corruption in Afghanistan. The reality is less simple as on a daily basis, ordinary Afghans are less concerned about the kinds of bribery that is (and does) occur when the US and Western  development agencies hand out big development contracts. Ordinary Afghans are more infuriated by the kinds of bribes that they often have to give to get what they are legally entitled to via “harassment bribes.”

Basically harassment bribes are like when a retired Afghan has to pay some cash to the pension officer to receive his retirement check. Or, when a young man or woman freshly graduated from college has to get his or her paperwork done in order to become a teacher. To accomplish this the prospective teacher will be asked to pay a hefty bribe. Or your Tazkira or national ID card is held up until you pay some cash to the officer in charge. These are all simple illustration of harassment bribes.

Harassment bribery is widespread in Afghanistan, and it plays a large role in breeding inefficiency and has a profoundly destructive effect on civil society. While President Karzai consistently wags the finger at the West for widespread corruption in Afghanistan, yet his administration has failed to take responsibility for banishing bribery on the lower level. The West has for a quiet life has looked the other way as local low level corruption tends to be written off as a fact of life something that indirectly may feed support for the Taliban.

Now it may be a question of scale, the World Bank has regularly appealed for future Afghan mining concessions to be better regulated and more transparent, and the UK’s new financial support is aimed at improving that process. Cameron’s theory is that by improving Afghan technical competence, and ensuring a transparent process, should help to secure that along with the concerns that vast investments made by companies from China and India have reduced  opportunities for others i.e. The UK.

When it comes to mining contracts it certainly appears to be a matter of scale. The award of a 30-year contract to a Chinese consortium to exploit the Mes Aynak copper mine in Logar province is one of the deals that has come in for particular criticism. The exact details of 2007 deal with China Metallurgical Group Corporation have never been made public, something that continues to fuel rumours of bribery and kick-backs along with serious concerns about the potentially massive environmental and cultural impact of the mining project on local communities and local people.

Some years ago, the Taliban blew up Afghanistan's ancient Buddha's of Bamiyan, provoking a degree of international outrage amongst the concerned and amongst the chattering classes. At the time the Taliban's brutal treatment of women and religious minorities oddly enough provoked less public outrage - no doubt because pipeline route deals (to get the oil out of Central Asia) were in the offing. Now, the country's rich archaeological heritage is facing a new and different threat - that of mineral exploitation and development of resources.

The Peoples Republic of China (currently busy sourcing minerals and foodstuffs from around the world to feed its economy and its people) has its sights on another ancient Buddhist site in pursuit of copper. Mes Aynak ironically is an ex al-Qaeda training camp and home to a 1,400 years old Buddhist monastery. This site is relatively intact with walls, corridors, stupas brightly painted red Buddha's. The monks originally settled here because there was copper in the ground; part of a Buddhist kingdom and a Silk Road way-station, other things carried Buddhism from India to Tibet, and into China.

The China Metallurgical Group (MGC) has a 30-year lease to mine copper to develop a copper mine. The mine alone could give Afghanistan $1.2 billion (£755 million) per year in revenue along with much needed jobs. Chinese miners have set up camp and special armed security guards patrol miles of fencing around the site. Beneath the site lies the world's second-largest untapped copper reserve, and the Chinese have bought the mineral rights to the entire area.

The archaeological site was discovered during excavation of the site for MGC - archaeologists have three years to salvage the site, which could easily take 10 years to properly excavate. Afghan archaeologists are aware of what has been lost in thirty years of war, and have deep concerns that a lot of their cultural heritage has been destroyed, damaged and looted. Their concerns stretch well beyond Afghanistan as they perceive the artefact's as not just belong to their country, but as human treasure which belongs to all of us.

Overwhelmed by both large and small scale corruption what can an endemically corrupt Afghan government do to discourage bribe givers and takers (at all levels of government) even if it wanted to? Endemic corruption aside the security situation is the key, with NATO leaving and the Taliban waiting in the wings things don’t look good.

Yet if things stabilise then there may be new rush to exploit Afghan mining opportunities, but, at what cost to the Afghans themselves, who have seen what has happened in other post-conflict countries. Elsewhere in the world, in Africa and elsewhere, large deposits of mineral resources have often proved to be a curse, often enriching the few (and the mining companies) rather than benefiting local people who have often lost out.

AS ONE DOOR CLOSES...

Last week in his State of the Union speech U.S. President Barack Obama declared that by the end of 2014 "our war in Afghanistan will be over." Aside from finally bring the soldiers home the end of this phase of the war in Afghanistan could have some long term consequences, including a slow but steady decrease in Western security interests, an increase in drug traffic and terrorism in Central Asia.  Will the West wash its hands of any involvement in Central Asia, something that will please Russia, the Peoples Republic of China and the drug dealers and the terrorists alike?

At the moment at least, US (and Western) policy is based on an assumption that the 350,000-strong Afghan National Army (with US assistance and advisers), will be able to hold off or at least manage the Taliban. After 2014, unless there is a political deal, the Taliban will stay in the field with varying degrees of control in most of the Pashtun areas and perhaps beyond them. How far have we come since the heady days of 2001, when the suggestion that a battered Taliban would still be active in the field thirteen years after the invasion, would have been treated with disbelief.

As the Soviet Union faded into history in the 1990s, Taliban were in control of much of Afghanistan, their success (and the support of Pakistan) encouraged other extremists in Central Asia. The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) who had fought alongside the Taliban in Afghanistan was responsible for bomb attacks in Uzbekistan and kidnappings in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. After the invasion in 2001, splinter groups like the Islamic Jihad Union (IJU), claimed responsibility for suicide bombings in Uzbekistan and targeted the U.S. and Israeli embassies in Tashkent (in 2004).

At present both the IJU and IMU have sought safe refuge in those parts of Pakistan which could politely be described as being effectively ungoverned.  Once NATO leaves Afghanistan their fight may yet be carried back to Central Asia, no doubt fuelled with the support and encouragement of Pakistan’s military and intelligence community. Power, politics, water and Islamic inspired insurgency are just some of potential problems that may feed Central Asia’s future insecurities.

Power and water are connected by plans to construct dams in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan which while boosting their economies also may threaten to reduce water for agriculture (cotton) in neighbouring Uzbekistan. There is already talk of ‘water wars’,  the flash point may be the lush (and relatively green) Ferghana Valley (which divided between Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan) with its complex mix of ethnic groups, it’s badly drawn borders (which date back to Stalin’s time) and fresh oppression, and a recruiting ground for Islamic jihadists. Back in 2005, Uzbek security forces killed hundreds of protesters in Andijon (in Uzbekistan).

Ethnic tensions have been simmering for years, several hundred Uzbeks and a smaller number of Kyrgyz died in bloody ethnic clashes in Osh (in Kyrgyzstan) and in nearby areas. To make things worse a historical cesspool of corruption in Central Asia (dating back to Soviet times) has worked to undermine most people’s belief in effective or fair governance. Transparency International’s corruption perception index of 174 states, lists Kazakhstan at 133rd, Kyrgyzstan at 154th, Tajikistan at 157th, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan are 170th. Afghanistan incidentally comes in at 174th; the UK comes in at 17th and Ireland at 25th.

Unfortunately for Central Asia, as the West’s interest in Afghanistan (and the rest of Central Asia) wanes as the Afghan war winds down, the region remains between ambitious reborn great powers in the shape of Russia and China. While some in the West may occasionally speak out against any moves by Russia to manipulate the CIS customs union to "re-Sovietize" Eurasia, soon there will be no Western boots (virtual or otherwise) on the ground let alone and desire to offer an alternative.

Kazakhstan, while resisting political union, is a member of the Russian dominated customs union. Neighbouring Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan with one-third to one-half of their economies being dependent on migrant-labour based remittance payments from Russia may not have the luxury of playing for time. As NATO influence wanes and it pulls out of its bases in the region, Russia may increase the pressure by offering protection by expanding its military foothold in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan which already reluctantly host Russian military bases.

For Central Asia, any choices may be stark ones, Russia to the north, Islamic fundamentalism to the south or the People’s Republic of China to the East. Already the PRC looms large in Central Asian economies, with opportunities for trade and inward investment. Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan now ship energy long distances to the PRC, something that hope may help reduce the effectiveness of Russia’s effective control of export pipeline routes to the West.

The PRC already uses the Shanghai Cooperation Organization to boost its Central Asian interests, for now admittedly these are mainly economic and energy related. While the PRC does not at least publicly challenge Russia's geopolitical role, as China's economic and political influence increases the Central Asian states freedom of action may be further reduced.

As NATO troop reductions in Afghanistan proceed, so NATO's need for logistical support via the northern distribution network in Central Asia will further diminish. The Central Asian governments, who are increasingly concerned that a NATO pullback (let alone a pullout) will leave the region more exposed to subversion and increased Russian and Chinese influence. Ironically the Central Asian States want continued Western support to hold off the IMU and IJU, to counter narcotics smuggling, and to help them keep Russian and Chinese power at arm’s length.

The brief 12 year period when the West’s had relative freedom of action in Central Asia is closing. Back in 2001, Russia effectively gave the USA and its coalition partners the go ahead to use bases in the region to support operations in Afghanistan. Now a more confident Russia is actively working to remove any NATO presence and influence from the region and is opposed to any Western involvement in dealing with the ongoing narcotics and terrorism problems.

In many ways the West failed to either effectively or consistently deal with the emergence of the newly independent Central Asian states and more widely failed to deal effectively with the demise of the Soviet Union and the emergence of the independent successor states. Western aid was relatively scare, and not tied into a respect for human rights and civil liberties. The often authoritarian governments have quite happily used security tools against their domestic protesters, something that has quite often fed political unrest and fundamentalism.

As NATO prepares to leave Afghanistan (and the region) what legacy if any will it leave behind? There should be some areas for security cooperation, information exchange and border security with the Central Asian states. There should be a more robust sharing of intelligence about terrorism, narcotics, and criminal threats. This could add to the solid, low-key work by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe and the European Union that has already been undertaken.

After 2014, it is quite possible that Central Asia will go back to being the focal point of yet another new Great Game, this time the battleground where outsiders seek to impose their influence may well only have two players, Russia and the PRC. Central Asian governments may well need assistance to securing themselves against external dangers, but the reality is that historic autocratic rule, weak governance and grim human rights records are as big a contributors to political instability as the threat of home grown or foreign Islamic insurgencies.

REMEMBRANCE 2014

In Flanders fields...

In a few days time it will be Remembrance Sunday, when some of us pause to remember the veterans and survivors of historic and more recent conflicts and those who never came back. My family like far too many others in Wales and elsewhere lost relatives in the First World War, one of my grandmother’s lost two brothers in the First World War, including her elder being a regular soldier, who wrote home and told them not to allow his younger brother to join up and to come out to France, but he did and was killed in action in 1918 and buried near Amiens.

In two years time, Remembrance Sunday will fall at the end of a few months’ worth of David Cameron’s (£50 million pounds worth) "historic" commemoration of the centenary of the start of World War I. While I have absolutely no problem remembering those who lost their lives and the courage and endurance of those who served in the First World War and other conflicts (including some of my relatives); I have no time for rose tinted nostalgic flag waving foot tapping pap.

As US President Abraham Lincoln rightly noted that the fallen have given their last full measure of devotion. Soldiers don’t die for the politicians, for patriotism or even us but for their friends and comrades who they serve with. Too many lie in corners of foreign fields, are names on a war memorial, faded photographs, faded memories or have no grave at all. The Lions may have been led by Donkeys (at times), but from our (21st century) perspective they were governed by bumbling incompetent idiots who were entirely out of their depth and managed to plunge the UK into an entirely unnecessary war.

Fritz Fischer’s suggested that the Imperial German government’s foreign policy was developed after Social Democratic gains in the 1912 election and that it aimed to start an aggressive war in 1914. He developed this idea in Germany's Aims in the First World War (1961) and War of Illusions: German policies from 1911 to 1914 (1969). Fischer suggested that a War Council held by the Kaiser Wilhelm II and the Reich's top military-naval leadership on December 8, 1912 was a key point in the run up to a war of aggression set for the summer of 1914. The Kaiser and the Army leadership wanted to start a war in December 1912 but Grand Admiral Alfred von Tirpitz, successfully argued that the German Navy needed more time to prepare and asked for the war be put off until the summer of 1914.  Fischer later denied claiming that war was decided upon at this meeting.

August 1914

Fischer’s work revealed Imperial German government documents which called for ethnic cleansing of Russian Poland and colonization to provide Germany with living space as a war aim, showed disturbing continuity between the foreign policies of Germany in 1914 and 1939. Andreas Hillgruber suggested that the Imperial German government tried to break the Triple Entente (Russia, France and Britain). Austria-Hungary was encouraged to invade Serbia on the assumption that Paris and London would have no interest in another Balkan crisis and would not support Russia. Austria attacked, Russia mobilized, German Chancellor Theobald von Bethmann Hollweg panicked activated the Schlieffen Plan against France and a Balkan crisis became a European war.

A.J.P. Taylor's 1969 book War by Timetable, suggested that none of the great powers wanted a war but all of them wanted to increase their power in comparison with their rivals. This fatal combination of an arms race and complex railway timetables for mobilization came to a head in 1914 when a perceived need to mobilize faster than their rivals trapped the political leaders in a mesh of complex logistics. Mobilization failed to deter war and led to military action.

In 1972 US historian Paul W. Schroeder, in his "World War I As A Galloping Gertie" essay, blamed Britain for the war. He suggested that the war was a "Galloping Gertie” that it got out of control, dragging in the Great Powers into an unwanted war. The key to the situation was British foreign policy which as anti-German and even more anti-Austrian. Britain never took Austria-Hungary seriously, and British diplomatic policy aimed to constantly force concessions from the Dual Monarchy regardless of any consequences to the balance of power. So 1914 was basically a preventive war forced on Germany to maintain Austria as a power, which was faced with a crippling British encirclement policy aimed at the break-up of that state.

Not everyone has bought into this theory, Samuel R. Williamson (a US historian) laid the blame on the Austro-Hungarian elite rather than the Germans in his 1990 book, Austria-Hungary and the Origins of the First World War. Niall Ferguson (the Scottish Historian) in his book, The Pity of War (1999) rejected the Fischer thesis, and squarely laid most of the blame on British diplomatic bumbling.  More recently, David Fromkin (a US historian) in his book Europe's Last Summer (2004) blamed military elements in the German and Austro-Hungarian leadership.

Fromkin argued that there were two key war plans; one by Austria-Hungary (and the German Chancellor) to start a war with Serbia to reinvigorate a fading Austro-Hungarian Empire. The other one, a secret plan created by the German Military aimed create a wider war with France and Russia.  The German military leadership, in the middle of a European arms race, thought that they would be unable to further expand the German army without extending the officer corps beyond the traditional Prussian aristocracy.

Thus Austria-Hungary was encouraged to go to war with Serbia; Russian intervention would provide an acceptable excuse to launch a preventive war. This theory suggests that the German military believed that by 1916–18, they could not win a war with France, Russia and Britain. Fromkin argued that Kaiser Wilhelm II was kept in the dark, as the German General Staff believed that he tended to resolve crises short of war. He also noted that all participating countries (especially the Central Powers) systematically destroyed or forged documents to shape future understanding of the origins of the war.

Some forty five years after its publication Fischer’s theory is still not without its critics. Annika Mombauer (Senior Lecturer in Modern European History at the Open University) suggested in her book, Helmuth von Moltke and the Origins of the First World War (2005) that despite the debate and research there was no direct evidence to suggest military decision-makers understood December 1912 as the decisive moment when the date of a future war had been set.

Christopher Clarke, in The Sleepwalkers: How Europe Went to War in 1914 (published in September 2012) argues that the Europe (of 1914) was actually in a more of a mess than we realise with clashing ideologies, terrorism, political and economic militancy and chronic instability. To make matters worse Europe was lumbered with an exceptionally ineffectual set of political leaders. The rulers of Europe, who boasted of their modernity and rationalism, in reality stumbled through crisis after crisis and until they ended up at war.

In the hundred years since its outbreak interpretation of the origins of the First World War has often been shaped by politics. Certainly since 1918 the left (from Karl Liebknecht onwards) has always been more comfortable blaming militarism for the First World War rather than their own failure to stop it at least until the collapse of the Soviet Empire and the Soviet Union (1988 – 1992).  The old SPD argument that within pre war Germany there had been an alliance of agrarians and industrialists who with the Prussian aristocracy had encouraged militarism and this led to war.

The idea that militarism fed the industrialists and fed popular state nationalism helping to reduce the influence of the left is still popular in some circles. It sounds good; the problem is that it’s probably not true, as noted by Niall Fergusson amongst others. There were other factors which were increasingly important in the run up to 1914. In many countries the franchise was expanding (if only slowly in some countries) and political parties with an anti militarist streak were rising in popularity. Industrial discontent and strikes was also pretty widespread between 1910 and 1914 across much of Europe.

Across the water in Ireland home rule was the key issue and probably the significant issue in domestic politics on the UK mainland. Britain in 1914 rather than enjoying a post Edwardian summer was on the verge of civil war over Irish Home Rule and faced massive industrial unrest. Italy had been rocked by the Red Week of June 1914, France and Germany were faced with ever-increasing political strife. Russia faced a huge wave of strikes and Austria-Hungary faced rising ethnic and class tensions.

So rather than marching in step towards war political anti militarism was increasing. Most businessmen, financiers and bankers were pretty unenthusiastic about the prospects and consequences of war because of the loss of markets and the economic disruption that war would bring. Liberalism itself was in trouble, collapsing in face of challenges from the extreme right and left in Britain, France and Italy while was pretty non-existent in Germany, Austria-Hungary and Russia.

The key factor as the countries on the European mainland blundered into war in 1914 due to a complex web of treaties and mobilization dependent war plans may have simply been ineptitude on the part of their leaders. The British state drifted into the ensuing conflict because its rulers were not bright enough to manage to stay out of it. Britain went to war in 1914 for no great principal and certainly not for the sake of Belgium’s neutrality. That alleged great principal was only created after the fact to hide British diplomatic blunders and miscalculations which resulted in the death and maiming of millions.

Putting the historical analysis to one side, I personally have a major problem with wrapping up the consequences of a combination of idiocy, short sightedness and lack of any understanding of basic consequences on the part of a mostly public school dominated nominally democratic elite in miles of bunting and union flags. Britain (in 1914) was barely a democracy, votes for all (at 21) did not finally come in until 1928, and post war governments soon found that live heroes (‘Homes fit for Heroes’) cost far more to remember and honour than dead ones.

From Cameron’s perspective even the choice of dates to be 'celebrated' may also prove somewhat controversial in itself? June 28th (2014) will mark the anniversary of the assassination in Sarajevo that started the European slide into war. Yet the Brits never really got involved in the mounting crisis until the very end of July 1914. August 1st which saw Germany declare war on Russia and Serbia is important. France mobilized on the evening of August 2nd, when Germany invaded Belgium and attacked French troops. On August 3rd, Germany declared war on France. August 4th is more significant on this side of La Manche, as Britain declared war on Germany, nominally because of the invasion of Belgium.

Royal Fusiliers in Mons 22nd August 1914

When it comes to selecting battles to commemorate the choice will be interesting with Mons (23rd – 24th August 1914) and La Cateau (26th August 1914) both relatively small and largely British battles. What followed in rapid succession was First Marne (5th and 12th September 1914), First Aisne (13th September – 28th September 1914), La Bassée (10th October – 2nd November 1914) and First Ypres (19th October – 22nd November 1914).After the Mons and La Cateau much of the fighting of 1914 (on the Western Front) largely involved mostly French and Belgian troops attempting to hold off the German Armies.

Britain's involvement (aside from at sea) was initially limited to its small regular army and the Territorial Army. The larger British army’s never emerged until 1915 and 1916 (after conscription came in). One result of the brutal and sustained fighting of the autumn and early winter of 1914 was that by the end of the year the precision instrument that was the regular army had almost ceased to exist. The grim battles of Flanders halted the German advance short of the Channel Ports and Picardy and established the trench line that would become the Western Front of 1915 – 1918.

I for one don’t believe that, History, repeats itself, but accept that the geography is pretty consistent and that there are periodic similarities of political circumstances. Cameron and the Unionists face a 2014 crisis (at least from their limited perspective) as the referendum on Scottish independence approaches. Much of Cameron’s enthusiasm for wrapping the First World War anniversaries in the Union Flag and bunting may be driven more by a desire to influence (via a ‘jubilee effect’) the Scottish referendum (planned for the autumn of 2014, although the date actually has yet to be fixed).

Mind you never know there may be a war with Iran (and its largely unpredictable consequences) by then to distract Cameron (and the rest of us) from the intricacies of the Scottish referendum and the dangers of Home Rule. Unlike in 1914, this time with the hard lessons learned from Afghanistan and Iraq fresh in our minds, the clueless idiots in charge cannot retrospectively say that they did not know what the consequences of joining in would be. Having had enough relatives serve (and some perish) in Britain’s wars over the last hundred years, I for one hope that our soldiers won’t end up paying the price for someone else’s ‘short’ unnecessary war again.