To summarize
the summary, the Chilcot Report (which covered the period from 2001 until 2009)
has confirmed that the dossier prepared by Blair to make the case for war was
deliberately distorted in order to convince Parliament to vote for an illegal
war. The dossier did not reflect the evidence given to Blair by the security
services. The report also confirms that Blair undermined the UN Security
Council’s authority and that war was not a last resort.
It is now clear
that when Blair was unable to secure a second UN resolution to legitimize the
war, he pretty much handed over UK foreign policy to George Bush. Blair’s
legacy is over a million dead, a failed state and a destabilized Middle East
riven by conflict. The region as a whole in crisis, with people abandoning
their homes and possessions and desperately fleeing their own brutal
governments and equally brutal terrorist organisations, to seek sanctuary in
Europe.
Basically the
dossier that was used to justify the invasion of Iraq was based on a whole
series of false statements (lies to the rest of us). Any judgements made about the severity of the threat
posed by Iraq's weapons of mass destruction were unsound or unproven. Yet
statements about WMD were written up as established fact – something which they
were not. The Intelligence material used to justify the invasion had "not
established beyond doubt" that Saddam Hussein had continued to produce
chemical and biological weapons.
Additionally the Joint Intelligence Committee said
Iraq has "continued to produce
chemical and biological agents" and there had been "recent production". It never stated
that Iraq had the means to deliver chemical and biological weapons and it did
not say that Iraq had continued to produce weapons. And Blair’s policy on the
Iraq invasion was made on the basis of flawed intelligence assessments – this
was not challenged, and it should have been robustly challenged – but wasn’t.
Blair staked everything on the case for war –
unfortunately for him (and the Blairites) - the circumstances in which it was
decided that there was a legal basis for UK military action were "far from satisfactory". The
invasion began on 20th March 2003 but it was not the 13th
March that the then Attorney General Lord Goldsmith advise that there was, on
balance, a secure legal basis for military action. It is worth noting that
aside from No 10's response to his letter on 14th March, no formal
record was made of that decision and the precise grounds on which it was made
remain unclear.
The UK's actions directly undermined the
authority of the United Nations Security Council, as the UN's Charter places responsibility
for the maintenance of peace and security on the Security Council. The UK
government made much of its false claim that it was acting on behalf of the
international community "to uphold
the authority of the Security Council". Yet it knew it did not have a
majority supporting its actions. In Blair’s Cabinet, there was little
questioning of Lord Goldsmith about his advice and no substantive discussion of
the legal issues was recorded.
If the case for war was flaky, so was the
preparation for war on the part of the MoD. Chilcot noted that the military had
"little time" to properly
prepare three military brigades for deployment in Iraq. For years soldiers who
have served in the army in recent and not so recent years have repeatedly told
me (`nd others) that they routinely bought their own kit.
The risks were neither "properly identified nor fully exposed"
to ministers, resulting in "equipment
shortfalls". Between 2003 and 2009, our soldiers in Iraq faced gaps in
some key capability areas - including armoured vehicles, reconnaissance and
intelligence assets and helicopter support.
Chilcot has noted that it was not sufficiently
clear which person in the department within the Ministry of Defence had
responsibility for identifying and articulating such gaps. Delays in providing
adequate medium weight protected patrol vehicles (something that resulted in
the deaths of our soldiers) and the failure to meet the needs of UK forces for
reconnaissance and intelligence equipment and helicopters should not have been
tolerated.
Despite repeated and explicit warnings, the
consequences of the invasion were significantly underestimated. The planning
and preparations for Iraq after Saddam Hussein were "wholly inadequate" – basically there was no coherent plan for the
aftermath of the invasion. The UK government pretty much failed to achieve its stated
objectives it had set itself in Iraq – and then in my opinion tried to spin its
way clear of the consequences.
More than 200 British soldiers died as a result
of the conflict. The Iraqi people also suffered greatly, by July 2009, at least
150,000 Iraqis had died, and more than one million were displaced. By 2016 this
figure had grown to 1.2 million and the consequences of the invasion and
destruction of the Iraqi dictatorship had destabilised the region and fed the
war in neighbouring Syria.
The decision to go to war understandably should
be the most difficult decision that any political leader ever has to make. To
justify that decision, with falsehood and deceit for simple political
expediency, is and will always be unforgiveable. Current and former political
leaders who directly lied to the public to make the case for a war, which put
our soldiers (without the necessary kit they needed and with ill-defined
objectives) into harms way, should justly face lasting consequences for their
actions.
