THE SHADOW OF A GUNMAN

A friend of mine summed up Russia’s actions in eastern Ukraine perfectly, saying that it is important to remember that historically the inhabitants of the Kremlin have never tended to do subtle either externally or internally. When it comes to ‘Soviet / Russian intervention’ to suppress striking East German workers (in 1953), the crushing of the Hungarian revolution (in 1956), the invasion of Czechoslovakia to crush the Prague spring (in 1968), the invasion of Afghanistan (in 1979) and the invasions of Georgia (in 2008) and recent events in Ukraine most people would be hard pressed to describe them as subtle.  

The shadow of a gunman...

Orchestrated by the Kremlin Russian nationalist elements active in eastern Ukraine are busy throwing their weight around and the realities of President Putin rule in Russia are coming home to roost.  News filtering out from eastern Ukraine is beginning to suggest a pattern to disappearances as journalists, local politicians, and ordinary citizens have begun to go missing at an alarming rate. The Kyiv Post and the Committee to Protect Journalists have compiled lists of documented cases of kidnappings in the region.

We are where we are because of Russia’s long planned but hastily implemented occupation of the Crimea which followed the collapse of the corrupt oligarchic pro Moscow government in Kyiv in the face of a bloody but popular revolt. The US Secretary of State John Kerry has rightly accused Russia of "distraction, deception and destabilisation" in eastern Ukraine. In the strongly worded statement, he has called on Moscow to help defuse the crisis or face further sanctions.

The  continuing unrest of eastern Ukraine has more to do with deflecting public opinion in Russia away from the example of Kyiv than anything else. That said the unrest in Eastern Ukraine was stirred up after, from the Kremlin’s perspective, a pro western revolt succeeded. The key and as yet unresolved issue remains as to whether the Ukraine looks east to Moscow or west to the EU looms large in the Kremlin’s thinking.

Last month Russia annexed Ukraine's mainly ethnic-Russian Crimea following a questionable referendum in the region which ‘choose’ to that backed joining the Russian Federation. Both the West and Kiev have said that the referendum was illegal and have refused to recognise it. The problem is that the Kremlin’s concerns for ‘Russians in zones of legitimate interest’ posses potential problems for Moldova (including in the Trans Dniester region) and other eastern states with Russian minorities.

For a man originally brought in as a safe pair of hands to safeguard the interests of a clique of oligarchs who made their fortunes plundering the privatised assets of the former Soviet Union while ordinary Russians lost their savings, President Putin sits securely (and genuinely elected with a large popular mandate) in the Kremlin. The President’s popularity is higher than ever, state’s coffers are full of accrued energy revenues, former oligarchs have been tamed, the bear has roared, Russia has expanded territorially for the first time since 1945 and the West’s criticism has been dismissed.

To a great extent we are all still living with the consequences of the second world war and the cold war – parallels between President Putin and the dictators from the 1930’s and 1940’s have already been drawn.  The legacy and legacy of Stalin’s terror continues to overshadow modern Russia to the day. Communist tyranny died of apathy and inertia in the early 1990’s this meant that there were no real consequences for the former communists and the agencies of the communist state. 

There was no day in court to answer for terrible crimes and abuses inflicted on the Russian people. There was no equivalent of a post cold war Nuremberg tribunal to bring the former communist functionaries (including the KGB) to account for their crimes against the Russian people continue to haunt the Russian people and the rest of us. Unlike in much of Eastern Europe the former dissidents never inherited political power the former communist bureaucrats did.

The West preferred to work hand in hand with former communists to saddle Russia the inheritor of much of the former Soviet state with a dubious legacy of privatisations. Now while there are some in the West who are quite happy to admire President Putin’s values the problem with appeasement is not how it starts but how it ends. If the West accepts that eastern Ukraine President Putin’s final territorial demand then we will be on seriously unstable political ground for the foreseeable future.

Disturbingly the modern Russia’s ‘brown’ vote long targeted by President Putin appears to be the home to some extreme views long dispatched to the home of the extreme right wing.  The Crimean Tartars, who suffered deportation at the hands of Stalin and years of discrimination at the hands of the Soviet authorities, now find themselves back in Russia and like some other ethnic and religious minorities at risk.

When it comes to articulating the consequences and realities of appeasement these are the times when we seriously miss people like Michael Foot who would have stated in no uncertain terms exactly what Russia’s intervention in Ukraine actually signifies. That murmur of Munich that drifted through the West’s chancelleries in the 1990’s over Bosnia clearly has not gone away. 

A combination of increasing EU dependence on Russia gas supplies and potential loss of trading opportunities seriously threatens to put the skids under any EU diplomatic response to recent events in eastern Ukraine. If we in the West choose to do nothing , then what message does that send to Russian and Belarusian democrats and would be democratic movements across Eurasia and the rest of the world? 

THE CRIMEAN CRISIS

Despite all the rhetoric and bluster emanating from Moscow about dire threats to the Russian speaking minority in the Ukraine, it is worth noting that they have pretty much never been under any threat. This is largely a Russian manufactured (and organised) crisis – one that has potentially dire consequences for the Ukraine specifically and for international relations in general.

Outside Sevastopol

In part what is taking place, from the point of view of Russian elite perceives is not different to western intervention in Kosovo, Afghanistan, Iraq and Libya. The Russians may have a point, the West’s denunciations of Russia’s actions as a violation of international law, might have slightly more authority if we were not living with the consequences of the West’s pretty much selective interpretation of  international law in recent years (complete with Blair’s dodgy dossier, etc). 

The Russian elite, the Russian media and perhaps a significant number of ordinary Russians (but by no means all) have never accepted that the former Soviet republics are truly independent referring to Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan and the central Asian stans as ‘near abroad’ as opposed to proper independent countries like Poland, Romania, etc. Western intervention in Kosovo jarred the Russian psyche badly, as did the earlier demise of the Soviet Union, the loss of prestige, status and real and defacto Empire has stung.

Unlike the Brits who had the best part of 50 years (to fail) to get over the loss of Empire, Russia lost most of its Empire in the best part of a fortnight in August 1991. The territorial integrity of the Ukraine is in peril, the Crimea (an autonomous if financially troubled republic within the Ukraine) has effectively been occupied by a combination of local Russian militia members (an ominous parallel with Bosnia in 1991) and Russian military units (most of whom were already based in the Crimea) operating from Russian bases in and around Sebastopol.

Part of the current problem is that Russia has some recent  history of this sort of bad behaviour, as the Soviet Union unravelled the region of Trans-Dniester was shorn off Moldova (in 1991/1992), more recently in 2005 Russia effectively annexed the province of South Ossetia from Georgia (to add to Abkhazia which was effectively occupied by pro Russian insurgents in 1992/1993). In an ominous echo of Kosovo, the former Georgian provinces are now ‘independent’ and under Russia’s protection.

Ironically encouraging the independence of a even Russian dominated Crimea, may not be the political result that Russia actually wants to achieve. As irrational as it may seem to many in the West, Russia’s preferred choice would be to literally re-integrate the Ukraine (as a whole) into the Kremlin’s new autocratic Eurasian political creation (perhaps alongside Kazakhstan and Belarus).

The Con Dems: Happy to protect the financial interests of the City

In all these previous cases the West’s response has been ineffective or somewhat mooted to say the least. At the time David Cameron (in opposition) denounced Russia’s actions, now in power his government has may not curb trade with Russia or close London's financial centre to Russians as part of any possible package of sanctions against Moscow – clearly the spirit of appeasement is alive and well in the Conservative party as it was during the Bosnian crisis.

It is worth noting that the Stop the war campaign group (with some of its members perhaps primarily but not entirely motivated by anti-Americanism) are busy condemning ‘fascism’ in the Ukraine rather than criticising this case of blatant Russian aggression. This ironically is a line that President Putin’s Russian media machine has been pumping out ever since the revolution began in Kyiv. Perhaps some of those old pro Soviet apologists have found a new home, having never really gone away.

It would be foolish to make the assumption that all the Russian speakers in the Ukraine have much time or sympathy for Putin’s autocratic vision of Russia. Those demonstrations that have taken place in the Crimea and eastern Ukraine have the appearance of being well organised rather than spontaneous. The old Soviet flags being waved to protect the largest surviving statue of Lenin (in the city of Kharkiv) and the news that some of the organisers drove down from Moscow to raise the Russian flag on Ukrainian government buildings should also be noted.

Russians make up about 58% of the population of the Crimea, historically getting the best jobs and best housing as they live high on the hog during the days of the Soviet Union. Ukrainians make up around 24.4% and the Crimean Tartars around 12.1% of the Crimea’s population. Despite all the hogwash and hot air about building Soviet man in the 50’s and 60’s from Moscow, Soviet man was pretty much a Russian speaking individual.

The Crimea, until 1954, was administered as part of Russia, before it was transferred by Khrushchev to the Ukraine.  The Russian’s in Crimea, benefitted from the ethnic cleansing of the indigenous Crimean Tartar inhabitants (in 1944) by Stalin who falsely accuse them of collaborating with the Nazi’s when the peninsula was occupied during the war. The Crimean Tartars were released from detention in Central Asia and Siberia following Khrushchev’s denunciation of Stalin’s brutal excesses in his famous ‘secret speech’ in 1956.

The Tartars received no aid or encouragement to return to their homeland, having to make their own way back, some illegally in the Soviet eras, and most only after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Many of those who came back discovered that their homes and lands had been taken over by Russian (and some Ukrainian) settlers. So somewhat understandably the Crimean Tartars (there are around 243,000 in the Crimea) have little or no love for Russia, and probably given a free choice would probably prefer to remain part of the Ukraine.

There may be no simple solution to the current crisis – the sensible most practical solution would be restoration of the status quo. Sadly it may come down to combination of brute force and pipeline politics, as much of central and eastern Europe is now deeply dependent on imported Russian gas. We may do well to hope for a mild spring, as once the lights begin to flicker, minds in various chancelleries may be concentrated, something that probably won’t help the Ukraine.

That said, if Russia’s defacto annexation of the Crimea is simply accepted and the West’s response is weak and ineffective, then were next for the Bear? And what message does that send to other potential aggressors? If the West ends up writing off the Ukraine as a larger version of a far away small country of which we know little and care even less - then so much for standing up for democratic and international values. If that happens then heaven help those Ukrainians and those Russians who would prefer to live in a sovereign free and democratic Ukraine rather than an a corrupt and autocratic one. 

DEMOCRACY POSTPONNED

The Afghan Electoral Commission has, stating that a lack of funds and security considerations being the primary cause, has announced that Afghan parliamentary elections that were set to take place prior to the 22nd May 2010, have been postponed for four months until September 2010. A few things strike me, in the bad old 'Cold War' days, unpleasant, corrupt, unstable and undemocratic regimes would usually announce that democratic elections would take place ' within 6 months' so 4 months is an improvement - and oddly enough said promised 'democratic elections' usually never took place.

While the Afghan Government is hopelessly corrupt, ridden with warlords, paedophiles, former (and current) drug dealers and criminals, and a few honest persons, there is a more than fair chance (with Western support) that the Afghan parliamentary elections will actually take place, if the UN manages to complete its passing around the hat operation to find the funds, whether or not any UK forces will be on the ground (or busy packing their bags) is another matter, somewhat dependent upon whether of not David Cameron manages to keep the appeasement wing of the Conservative Party quiet. And I suspect that Gordon Brown, wishes he could put back the forthcoming Westminster election by four months...